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*JOINT MEMORANDUM*

REVISED CIA/DIA ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT  
MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

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Revised CIA/DIA Estimates of Warsaw Pact  
Manpower in the NATO Guidelines Area

2. We have increased our estimate of overall Pact manpower in the NGA from 1,040,000 to some 1,130,000. (See Table 1). The ground forces total is increased slightly from 925,000 to an estimated 927,000 and the air forces from 112,000 to about 202,000. All of the changes on Table 1 result from higher estimates of air forces and national air defense forces and from redefinition of certain categories of forces. A notable example occurs with the apparent decrease in East German ground forces of about 10,000 men. This results from a determination that East German SAM troops and other ground-based national air defense elements should be counted with the air force total rather than the ground force total.

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Increased Estimates for Air Force and National Air Defense Personnel

3. The changed estimates of Pact air and air defense force personnel in NGA result from [ ] new information and refinements in the estimative analysis which now accounts for personnel involved in rear services overhead type activity. These revised estimates account for all of the changes reflected in Table 1.

4. The new information serves two purposes. First, it helps to dispel the conventional belief that the Pact can support large air and air defense forces with an extremely low ratio of support to combat personnel.

Ground Force Manpower Estimate

6. The 2,000 increase in the estimate of ground force personnel is a result of revised estimates of ground elements of national air defense forces. Otherwise, we have no basis for changing our current estimate of Warsaw Pact ground forces manpower. It should be pointed out that for MBFR purposes estimates of Pact military manpower do not include personnel in internal security and border guard functions. In the NGA these paramilitary forces comprise about 120,000 to 175,000 indigenous personnel. Some elements of these forces are equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers and possess combat capability approaching that of regular ground forces.

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Table 1

Warsaw Pact Military Manpower in NGA 1/

	New Estimate		Previous Estimate	
	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Ground Forces	Air Forces
Soviet:				
GSFG	360,000	40,800	360,000	36,500
NGF	30,000	13,700	30,000	15,000
CGF	70,000	5,600	70,000	5,000
Total*	<u>460,000</u>	<u>60,100</u>	<u>460,000</u>	<u>56,500</u>
Indigenous				
East Germany	90,400	38,300	100,000	12,000
Poland	219,100	60,500	210,000	25,000
Czechoslovakia	157,900	42,900	155,000	18,000
Total*	<u>467,000</u>	<u>142,000</u>	<u>465,000</u>	<u>55,000</u>
Total NGA*	<u>927,000</u>	<u>202,000</u>	<u>925,000</u>	<u>112,000</u>

1. Includes all uniformed Pact military personnel on active duty in NGA, including national air defense personnel. Does not include naval personnel, personnel in reserves, territorial defense forces, or other paramilitary organizations.
2. Does not include elements of the Air and Air Defense Command which are shown in East German Air Force total.
3. Includes SAM, AAA and some radar personnel of the respective air defense commands.

\* These totals have been rounded to three significant digits.

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#### Confidence Factor in the Revised Estimates

7. As a result of the new information and improved methodologies our confidence in the accuracy of the new estimates of Pact military personnel in the NGA is higher than that held in the old estimates.

8. In percentage terms, confidence in the estimates of personnel involved in operational or direct support activity is high--the estimate is not expected to vary from the actual by more than ten percent. Confidence in estimates of personnel involved in headquarters, rear services, and army and front level support vary from 15 to 25 percent depending on the force element involved. The greatest area of uncertainty continues to be the number of personnel in such national overhead elements as defense ministries, military academies and schools, and various administrative, medical, and central support units. Estimates of these overhead elements we assign a confidence level of  $\pm 25\%$ . These levels of uncertainty apply even in those cases where reliable aggregate information is available, because of the remaining uncertainty concerning the composition of the various sub-elements of the respective forces.

9. Considering the varying confidence levels attaching to the manpower estimates in these categories of military activity and their respective impact on the total figures for the indigenous East European forces in NGA, the totals shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are confidently judged to be within 15 percent of the actual current numbers. Because the Soviet forces stationed in NGA do not include a large overhead establishment, the Soviet total can be confidently judged to be within ten percent of actual.

#### The Problem of Categorization by Uniform Service

10. The data presented in Table 1 are organized to fit into a two-service mold to ease comparison with NATO concepts of uniform service.

11. Generally speaking, the distinctions drawn between uniform services in Pact military forces are not as sharply drawn as in US forces. This complicates the intelligence task of estimating personnel by service.

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Moreover, the service responsibility for certain functions--notably tactical air support and tactical and strategic air defense--varies from country to country both in the Pact and NATO.

12. The most serious problem of interpretation raised by the two-service format relates to those personnel involved in national air defense. Table 2 below presents the numbers of personnel estimated to be involved in national air defense in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and indicates how these personnel are counted in the totals given in Table 1. The national air defense personnel in Poland and Czechoslovakia are organized in a distinct command. Accordingly the two-service breakdown is misleading, and may not be acceptable to the Pact negotiators.

13. In any case, the breakdown of Pact personnel by uniform service cannot be estimated with confidence. The arbitrary division of the various sub-elements of national air defense by uniform service are, for the most part, not supported by good intelligence information.

14. An alternative presentation of the data which would facilitate functional comparisons with NATO and avoid the estimative uncertainties inherent in the two-category uniformed service format is shown in table 3.

15. Such a format, which focuses on the functions of personnel would require rigorous definition of the main functional categories, but would be more flexible (the number of categories could be expanded), more easily understood by both NATO and Pact negotiators and more confidently supported by US intelligence.

#### Issues and Alternatives for Presenting the New Data to the Allies

16. The new US estimates of Pact ground force and air forces strengths should not cause serious problems with the Allies. The difference in the ground force figure is so small (0.3%) that it may not be worth raising at this time if we continue to use the current

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Table 2

Indigenous Warsaw Pact National Air Defense Manpower

<u>Country</u>	<u>National Air Defense</u>	<u>NAD Personnel Listed in Table 1 as Air Force</u>	<u>NAD Personnel Listed in Table 1 as Ground Force</u>
Poland	45,200	18,500	26,700
CSSR	25,700	10,800	14,900
East Germany	<u>22,100</u>	<u>22,100 1/</u>	<u>          </u>
	93,000	51,400	41,600

1. All national air defense personnel in East Germany are in the East German Air and Air Defense Command and, as such, they are considered to be Air Force in the two-service categorization.

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Table 3

Warsaw Pact Military Manpower in NGA  
Alternative Functional Categorization

	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>National Air Defense</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Totals</u>
<u>Soviet</u>				
GSFG	360,000	N/A	40,800	400,800
NGF	30,000	N/A	13,700	43,700
CGF	70,000	N/A	5,600	75,600
Total *	<u>460,000</u>	<u>N/A</u>	<u>60,100</u>	<u>520,000</u>
<u>Indigenous</u>				
East Germany	90,400	22,100	16,200	128,700
Poland	192,400	45,200	42,000	279,600
CSSR	143,000	25,700	32,100	200,800
Total *	<u>426,000</u>	<u>93,000</u>	<u>90,300</u>	<u>609,000</u>
Total Pact *	<u>886,000</u>	<u>93,000</u>	<u>150,000</u>	<u>1,130,000</u>

\* These totals have been rounded to three significant figures.

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data categories with the Allies and the East. The new air force totals present a greater problem because of the large increase. However, the new US number (202,000) is considerably closer to the 180,000 man estimate which the FRG has recently disclosed than was our previous estimate of 111,500. In any case, we have developed rationales and estimating methods which can be used to support the new estimates in detail without disclosure of sensitive information.

17. The main advantage of the functional force categories described in paragraphs 14-15 is that they compare more closely with the categories used in the Pact and are therefore susceptible to more confident intelligence analysis. They are likely to be better understood by the East than would our present categories. But the Allies are not accustomed to thinking of forces in these categories--although Allied intelligence specialists will recognize them--and may resist them. Also, it must be noted that the Pact negotiators have not raised the issue, perhaps because they realize that the current categories tend to encourage undercounting Pact manpower.

18. We believe that before any decision could be made on adopting new categories some further analysis of US and Allied forces along functional lines would be necessary. It is not presently clear how the NATO/Pact force ratios would fall out.

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